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Abstract
Stewards of social science data face a fundamental tension. On one hand, they want to
make their data accessible to as many researchers as possible to facilitate new discoveries. At the
same time, they want to restrict access to their data as much as possible in order to protect the
people represented in the data. In this paper, we provide a case study addressing this common
tension in an uncommon setting: the Fragile Families Challenge, a scientific mass collaboration
designed to yield insights that could improve the lives of disadvantaged children in the United
States. We describe our process of threat modeling, threat mitigation, and third-party guidance.
We also describe the ethical principles that formed the basis of our process. We are open about
our process and the trade-offs that we made in the hopes that others can improve on what we have
done.
1 Introduction
Social data—data about people—can be both valuable and dangerous. On one hand, they
can be used to advance scientific understanding and yield insights that can benefit society. On the
other hand, they can be used in ways that violate privacy and lead to other harms. Stewards of
social data, therefore, face a fundamental tension. At one extreme, a data steward could share a
complete dataset publicly with everyone. This full release approach maximizes the potential for
scientific discovery, but it also maximizes risk to the people whose information is in the dataset.
At the other extreme, a data steward could share the data with no one. This no release approach
minimizes risk to participants, but it also eliminates benefits that could come from the responsible
use of the data. In between these two extremes—no release and full release—there are a variety of
intermediate solutions, which involve balancing risk to participants and benefits to science (Figure
1). In this paper, we present a case study describing how we balanced this trade-off between risks
and benefits when we served as data steward during the Fragile Families Challenge. We hope
that this case study will benefit a variety of data stewards, including those within universities,
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companies, and governments. We also hope that this case study will benefit policymakers who
seek to enable responsible data access and researchers who seek responsible access to detailed and
potentially sensitive social data.
The Fragile Families Challenge is a scientific mass collaboration involving hundreds of
researchers. During this mass collaboration, a diverse group of social scientists and data scientists
worked with a common dataset that contained detailed information about the lives of about 5,000
families in the United States, many of whom were disadvantaged. The detailed nature of the data
made the project particularly valuable for developing knowledge about the lives of disadvantaged
families, yet these very features also heightened concerns about privacy and ethics. In other words,
the Challenge brought the tension between risks and benefits into sharp focus. In this paper, we
provide no single solution to the fundamental tension between access and privacy; instead, we
describe our process of addressing it. More specifically, this paper describes the privacy and ethics
audit that we conducted from December 2016 through March 2017, as well as steps we carried out
during the Challenge from March through August 2017 (see timeline in Figure 2).
The paper is divided into 8 sections. Section 2 provides more background about the data
and the Challenge. Section 3 describes our threat modeling and threat mitigation strategies, and
Section 4 describes our response plan in case our mitigations were ineffective. Section 5 sum-
marizes our mechanisms for third-party guidance. Section 6 discusses the ethical principles that
guided our thinking. Section 7 describes our ultimate decision to conduct the Challenge. Section
8 concludes. Although the paper is written linearly, the real process—summarized in Figure 3—
cycled through all of these steps many times. We are open about our process and the trade-offs that
we made in the hope that others can improve on what we have done.
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Figure 1: Data access involves a fundamental tension between risk to respondents and benefits
to science. If research requires releasing data, then those who manage the data face a tension
between risk to respondents and benefits to science. It is objectively best to maximize benefits at a
given level of risk and objectively best to minimize risk at a given level of benefits. On the frontier,
the balance between risk and benefits becomes a normative question. The frontier is curved because
we expect that, at low levels of risk, slight increases in risk might yield especially large benefits.
For instance, moving from no release of data to release of a highly redacted form of the data might
yield substantial benefits. At higher levels of risk, the returns to increased risk may be smaller.
For instance, including respondents’ addresses in the data release would substantially increase risk
with only minimal benefits. We emphasize that this curve is merely a heuristic device; in realistic
situations it is difficult—perhaps impossible—to define and quantify risks and benefits (Lambert,
1993; Karr et al., 2006; Cox et al., 2011; Skinner, 2012; Goroff, 2015; Narayanan et al., 2016).
Further, many researchers are developing techniques, such as differential privacy (Dwork, 2008),
that try to improve the trade-offs.
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Figure 2: Timeline of the privacy and ethics process for the Fragile Families Challenge. Boxed
nodes represent events occurring at a specific point in time, such as the decision to proceed. Lines
represent activities which occurred over the course of a period of time, such as seeking informal
external advice.
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Figure 3: Privacy and ethics audit for the Fragile Families Challenge. Our process involved (a)
threat modeling to make precise our fear of re-identification, (b) threat mitigation to reduce risk,
and (c) the guidance of third parties such as the IRB at Princeton University and the Fragile Fami-
lies Challenge Board of Advisors. The entire process was undertaken within an ethical framework
which we describe in Section 6. While the paper is written linearly, we emphasize that these steps
were not taken linearly; we cycled through all the steps many times.
2 Background
2.1 Fragile Families Study
The Fragile Families Challenge builds on the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study
(hereafter Fragile Families Study), a longitudinal study of 4,898 families. The study began with
a probability sample of newborns in 20 large U.S. cities, of which 16 cities form a probability
sample of all U.S. cities with populations over 200,000 (Reichman et al., 2001). For more than 15
years, researchers have followed these families to collect information related to child and family
development as reported by the child as well as the child’s mother, father, primary caregiver, and
teachers. These rich longitudinal data have already been used in hundreds of published papers and
dozens of dissertations on aspects of urban poverty including multiple-partner fertility (Carlson
and Furstenberg, 2006), multigenerational households (Pilkauskas, 2012), paternal incarceration
(Wildeman, 2009), housing instability (Desmond and Kimbro, 2015), and neighborhood disadvan-
tage (Donnelly et al., 2017).1
Four features of the Fragile Families Study were particularly relevant to the design and
conduct of the Fragile Families Challenge. Many of these features are common in large-scale
1For a complete list of research using the Fragile Families Study, see https://ffpubs.princeton.edu/.
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social science datasets, but may not be common in datasets held by companies and governments.
These features also make these data different from some types of data commonly considered in
privacy research.
First, these data were collected with informed consent. Parents explicitly agreed to join
the study and made this agreement on behalf of their children. Further, the children themselves
provided their assent to participate once they were old enough. These procedures were overseen
by the Institutional Review Board of Princeton University. Informed consent makes the Fragile
Families Study different from many other cases privacy scholars have considered. For instance,
a main critique of the use of Facebook data for research purposes has been the lack of informed
consent; participants may not expect their activity on Facebook to be used in research (Zimmer,
2010). In this case, however, respondents learned about the goals of the study and gave explicit
permission for the information they provided to be used by researchers.
Second, these data are already available to researchers through an established system. This
data access system, which is overseen by the Institutional Review Board of Princeton University,
has already been used by thousands of researchers for more than 15 years. The current data ac-
cess system follows a tiered model in which there are Basic Files and Restricted Files (Figure
4). The two main differences between the Basic and Restricted Files are the application process
and the types of data that are provided; in all cases, the data are stripped of obviously personally
identifying information.2 This system of tiered access served as our baseline as we designed and
2The Restricted Files may contain detailed geographic, genetic, or other data deemed especially sensitive or iden-
tifiable. Access to these files requires a detailed restricted data contract and a carefully vetted research proposal. The
Fragile Families staff grants approval only to projects with research merit that can only be achieved with the restricted
files. Data are shared only after researchers sign a data protection agreement, show that they have completed NIH-
approved Protecting Human Research Participants training, provide evidence of approval from the Institutional Review
Board of their institution, and detail a data protection plan summarizing how data will be used. Student applicants
must apply with a faculty mentor who bears responsibility for violations of the agreement. Researchers approved in
this process are given access to a tailored version of the data with detailed information only on the domains relevant
to their research. For instance, a researcher studying neighborhood effects would be given neighborhood information
but not genetic information, while a researcher studying epigenetics would be given genetic information but not neigh-
borhood information; only researchers with projects involving both fields would be given data covering both domains.
Fragile Families staff work with researchers to determine the particular variables needed for any given study. The Ba-
sic Files exclude obvious personally identifying information and obvious geographic information, such as city of birth
and residential location. To obtain these files, researchers must agree to a set of terms and conditions and propose a
viable project which Fragile Families staff approve as potentially important social science research. Several thousand
researchers have completed these procedure and were already using the data before the Challenge began.
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implemented the Fragile Families Challenge. We think it is reasonable to accept the current sys-
tem as our baseline because this system developed over many years in the full view of the scientific
community.
The third feature of the Fragile Families Study that shaped our design of the Challenge is
that these data contain information about many people around the focal child—such as the mother,
father, primary caregiver, and teacher—and contain information about many domains of the re-
spondents’ lives. For example, the study collects information about the home environment, the
school environment, teacher characteristics, parental criminal history, and child health, to name
just a few domains (Figure 5). The multi-domain, linked nature of the data increases its scientific
value, but it also increases risks for two main reasons. First, it creates many possible entry points
for a re-identification attack (this risk will be described in more detail in Section 2.3). Second,
the multi-domain nature of the data increases the harm that could occur if a re-identification attack
was successful, because many potentially sensitive pieces of information would be revealed. The
linked, multi-domain nature of the data differs from the cases normally considered by privacy re-
searchers, which usually involve a collection of individuals with information from a single domain
(e.g., medical records).
The fourth and final feature that is relevant to the Fragile Families Challenge is that these
data are frequently used in scientific and policy debates. For example, a recent National Academies
of Sciences report on the effects of parental incarceration on children drew heavily on the Fragile
Families Study (Travis et al., 2014). Although these data have already been used extensively by
social scientists, we thought that it would be possible to learn even more if a larger, more diverse
group of researchers approached the data in a very different way. This goal of increased scientific
and policy impact was one of the main motivations for the Fragile Families Challenge.
2.2 Fragile Families Challenge
The Fragile Families Challenge is a mass collaboration that combines predictive modeling,
causal inference, and in-depth interviews to yield insights that can improve the lives of disadvan-
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Figure 5: Domains covered in the Fragile Families Study basic files. The number of substantive
domains included makes the Fragile Families Study especially useful to social scientists. The
number of domains also (a) facilitates re-identification because many possible auxiliary datasets
may be used by an adversary and (b) increases the risk of harm in the event of re-identification
because substantial information about respondents’ private lives could become public. Source:
http://fragilefamilies.princeton.edu/documentation
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taged children in the United States. This paper—and the special issue of the journal Socius in
which this paper will be published—describes the first stage of the Fragile Families Challenge,
which focuses on predictive modeling. This predictive modeling stage follows an approach called
the Common Task Framework which is used frequently in computer science (Donoho, 2017) and
biomedical research (Saez-Rodriguez et al., 2016). The Common Task Framework is a process
that invites many researchers to participate in a unified task characterized by three key aspects: 1)
a common predictive modeling goal using 2) a single dataset made available to all with 3) a well-
defined scoring metric to evaluate contributions. This process often yields better predictive per-
formance than any individual researcher can realize working alone (e.g., Bennett et al. 2007) and
often leads to new scientific and methodological insights (e.g., Feuerverger et al. 2012). Donoho
(2017) went so far as to describe the Common Task Framework as part of “the ‘secret sauce’ of
machine learning.”
As described in more detail in the introduction to the special issue in which this paper will
be published (Salganik et al., 2018), we set out the goal of using the data collected from a family
at the birth of the child up to when the child was age 9 to predict data from the family when the
child was 15 years old. This age 15 data had been collected but was not yet available to participants
(Figure 6). The existence of this collected but otherwise unavailable data is critical for the Common
Task Framework, and fortunately all longitudinal social surveys present this possibility every time
a new wave of data has been collected. Among the many possible outcomes in the year 15 data,
we asked participants in the Challenge to predict six key outcomes: grade point average (GPA) of
the child, grit of the child, material hardship of the family, whether the family was evicted from
their home, whether the primary caregiver participated in job training, and whether the primary
caregiver lost his or her job. The choice of these outcomes was driven by ethical considerations
and our scientific goals, and each outcome is described in more detail in the introduction to the
special issue in which this paper will be published.
As is typical in projects using the Common Task Framework, we split the year 15 data
for these six outcomes into three groups: 1) a training set which we provided to participants, 2) a
12
Figure 6: Fragile Families Challenge data structure. Participants built models predicting the
age 15 outcomes using data collected while the focal child was age 9 and younger. We provided
participants with the data represented by the white boxes. Submissions were scored based on their
predictive performance (mean squared error) for the observations represented by the gray boxes,
which were available only to organizers. The leaderboard set contained 1/8 of all observations and
was used to provide instant feedback on submissions. The holdout set contained 3/8 of observations
and was used to produce final scores for all submitted models at the end of the Challenge.
leaderboard set which participants could access during the Challenge, and 3) a holdout set which
participants could not access until the first stage of the Challenge was complete (Hardt and Blum,
2015) (Figure 6). Participants in the Challenge received the training set and a specially constructed
background data file that contained information about the family from birth to age 9 (more on the
construction of this file is described in Section 3.2.6). This background file included 4,242 families
and 12,942 variables about each family. The high-dimensional nature of the data—more predictors
than observations—is a result of the linked, multiple-domain nature of the data (as discussed above)
and has important implications for privacy (as discussed below).
Challenge participants used the background data file and training data to build statistical
or machine learning models. They used these models to predict the holdout data (e.g., grade point
average at age 15). We measured the quality of these predictions using mean squared error.3
The immediate goal of this stage of the Fragile Families Challenge was to find the most
3The mean squared error is a common scoring metric, and it can be written as 1n
∑n
i=1(yi − yˆi)2 where where yˆi
is the predicted value for person i, yi is the true value for person i, and n is the number of people in the holdout set.
For binary outcomes, mean squared error is sometimes called Brier score (Brier, 1950).
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accurate predictive model for the six outcomes. Given the nature and size of the data—thousands
rather than millions of observations—we wanted to learn the extent to which machine learning
methods would improve predictive performance beyond the generalized linear models typically
applied by social scientists. This explicit focus on prediction is atypical for social science, but sub-
stantial current scholarship argues that prediction is important for both scientific and policy reasons
(Breiman et al., 2001; Shmueli, 2010; Watts, 2014; Kleinberg et al., 2015, 2017; Mullainathan and
Spiess, 2017; Hofman et al., 2017).
In our case, the immediate goal of prediction was important to prepare for a long-term goal
of explanation and hypothesis generation. As will be described in future papers, these predictions
will be used to target qualitative, in-depth interviews with families who reported unexpected out-
comes. We hope that these interviews will help us discover important and currently unmeasured
factors and generate hypotheses about how these may impact the lives of disadvantaged families.
We also hope that the interviews will inform the credibility of the assumptions required to draw
causal inferences from survey data in a setting in which thousands of pretreatment variables are
potentially involved in confounding.
2.3 Why worry?
The data from the Fragile Families Study were collected with informed consent and are
already provided to researchers under a well-established system, all of which has been overseen
by the Institutional Review Board of Princeton University. More generally, survey data of this type
have been provided to researchers in a similar fashion for over 50 years. Why should we worry
about the risk of re-identification in the Fragile Families Challenge?
Quite simply: all data are potentially identifiable. This possibility was made clear to us
in one of our first meetings when a member of our team (Narayanan) proposed the following
hypothetical scenario. Imagine an all-powerful and evil business magnate like Lex Luthor, Super-
man’s archenemy. Further imagine that Lex Luthor heard about the Fragile Families Challenge
and wished to re-identify the data. Lex could invest billions of dollars to conduct a census of every
14
child born from 1998 through 2000 in the cities covered by the Fragile Families Study. Then Lex
could merge his census with the Fragile Families Challenge data, identify everyone, and then learn
everything about them in the Fragile Families Study.
This hypothetical attack from Lex Luthor illustrates two important points. First, it illus-
trates a common pattern in re-identification attacks. Data that have been de-identified, meaning
stripped of obviously identifying information in an effort to protect privacy, can often be re-
identified by linkage to an auxiliary dataset that contains identifying information. Through this
process of merging, the apparently anonymous data are re-identified (Ohm, 2010). This hypotheti-
cal attack also illustrates that the safety of a given dataset depends not just on that dataset but on all
the auxiliary data that exist today and may exist in the future (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2010).
De-identification of a dataset does not guarantee anonymity.
Re-identification attacks like the one performed by Lex Luthor are not merely hypothetical
risks, unfortunately. Although we do not know the frequency with which these attacks occur “in the
wild,” we do know that academic privacy researchers have conducted and published similar attacks
(we will discuss their motivations for these attacks in Section 3.1.1).4 Two prominent examples
come from the research of Latanya Sweeney. First, while a graduate student at MIT, Sweeney
(2002b) was able to re-identify apparently anonymous medical records that were provided to re-
searchers by the Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission. She did this by combining the
apparently anonymous medical records, which contained date of birth, zip code, and sex, with
non-anonymous voter registration data, which also contained date of birth, zip code, and sex. Be-
cause these three variables were available in both the de-identified data and the identified auxiliary
data, Sweeney was able to merge them together (Figure 7). Fortunately, rather than posting all
of the records online, Sweeney mailed Massachusetts Governor William Weld a copy of his own
records. More importantly, Sweeney published a paper describing her attack and a proposing a
defense against that kind of attack (Sweeney, 2002b, 2005; Ohm, 2010).
Beyond simple merges between two files, re-identification attacks can also involve multiple
4For an attempt to estimate the rate of re-identification attacks that have been published in the academic literature,
see El Emam et al. (2011).
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sources of auxiliary information. For example, Malin and Sweeney (2004) combined databases
of DNA records, which contained time and place of collection, with publicly available hospital
discharge data. This hospital discharge data in turn contained basic demographic information that
could be used to combine it with identified voter registration records (Malin and Sweeney, 2004)
(Figure 7). In other words, the hospital discharge data served as a critical middle step as Malin and
Sweeney linked the de-identified DNA records with identified voting records.
The hypothetical example of Lex Luthor clarifies that all data are potentially identifiable
when facing a powerful adversary. Further, Sweeney’s re-identification attacks—as well as attacks
by other privacy and security researchers (Narayanan et al., 2016)—show that re-identification at-
tacks are possible in the real world and that these attacks benefit from the presence of rich auxiliary
datasets. These facts alone suggest that social scientists should be concerned about the possibility
of re-identification attacks. A further cause for concern is that re-identification attacks are proba-
bly easier today than at any time in the past. Just as scientists are excited about big data sources
for research, adversaries can use these same big data sources for re-identification attacks. Because
all data are potentially identifiable and because re-identification attacks are easier now than at any
time in the past, we were concerned about the possibility of a re-identification attack during the
Fragile Families Challenge.
2.4 Potential technical solutions
Because the risk of re-identification attacks occurs in many situations, researchers have
developed techniques that facilitate the analysis of data while protecting the privacy of the people
described in the data (Willenborg and De Waal, 2001; Duncan et al., 2011; Dwork and Roth,
2014). We believe that many social scientists, following the lead of statisticians, would organize
these privacy-preserving techniques into two main groups: those that focus on modifications to the
data and those that focus on access to the data (Reiter and Kinney, 2011; Duncan et al., 2011).
However, our own deliberations were more influenced by the literature in computer science, and
so we organized these privacy-preserving techniques into two different groups: those that offer
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A. Sweeney’s 2002b re-identification of Massachusetts medical records
Prescriptions
Diagnoses
Name
Address
Date of birth
Zip code
Sex
Medical records Voting records
B. Malin and Sweeney’s 2004 re-identification of genomics data
DNA
Collection
time and
place
Date of birth
Zip code
Sex
Name
Address
DNA records
Hospital
discharge data Voting records
Figure 7: Re-identification examples with de-identified data. In both examples, the adversary
succeeded because key variables were available in both the de-identified dataset (blue) and an
identified auxiliary dataset (red). In addition to merges between two datasets (Sweeney, 2002b),
re-identification can proceed through a chain of auxiliary datasets (Malin and Sweeney, 2004).
17
provable guarantees and those that do not. Techniques that offer provable guarantees would enable
us to provide specific, mathematical bounds on what an adversary might be able to learn about
individuals in the dataset, while making minimal assumptions about the adversary’s knowledge,
capability, or behavior. During our deliberations, we considered two approaches that offer provable
guarantees: differential privacy and cryptography. Unfortunately, as we will now describe, we did
not believe either approach was feasible in our setting. For the Challenge we relied on many
techniques that didn’t offer provable guarantees. Before describing the techniques we used, we
will summarize the approaches we considered that offer provable guarantees, and we will describe
why we did not think they were appropriate in our setting.
The first main approach that we considered that offers provable guarantees is differential
privacy (Dwork, 2008; Dwork and Roth, 2014). Differential privacy is a set of techniques for de-
veloping data release algorithms that achieve the following privacy guarantee: any output of the
data release algorithm would have been roughly as likely even if any particular record had been
removed from the data. Intuitively, this means that the adversary can’t tell from the data release
whether or not any individual’s record was included in the sample, and this property is defini-
tionally treated as a kind of individual privacy. Within the broad area of differential privacy, we
considered two families of approaches. Under one family of approaches—called non-interactive
approaches—we would release a modified form of the data to Challenge participants.5 Under the
other family of approaches—called interactive approaches—we would not release any data; rather,
we would keep the data on a secure server and allow researchers to send queries to the server.6
Within the family of non-interactive approaches, we considered two sub-families of ap-
5The idea of releasing a modified form of the data in order to increase privacy protections is common in social
science. However, many of the approaches that are typically used with social data, such as top-coding and coarsening,
do not generally offer provable guarantees within the framework of differential privacy. This does not mean that these
approaches should not be used. In practice, we think they often make re-identification attacks more difficult, and we
used some of them as described in Section 3.2.6.
6Some researchers refer to these two families as offline approaches and online approaches (Dwork and Roth, 2014).
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proaches: transformed data7 and synthetic data8, but we concluded that neither approach was fea-
sible in our setting.
In addition, we also considered interactive approaches where we would have hosted the
Challenge data on a server and allowed Challenge participants to query the data (e.g., request a
specific regression model). We would then return results with carefully generated noise that would
satisfy differential privacy. We found that interactive approaches to differential privacy required
major changes to the workflow of analysts and restricted the types of analysis that were possi-
ble.9 In conclusion, although we think differential privacy is an elegant and promising approach
to providing provable guarantees, we did not think these approaches—either non-interactive or
7Under the transformed data approach, we would not release individual-level data but rather some aggregated form
of data that could then be used for analysis. For example, for a movie recommendation task, McSherry and Mironov
(2009) argue that many predictive algorithms operate on the movie-movie covariance matrix, and they demonstrate
how to achieve differential privacy for this class of algorithms by releasing a perturbed version of the covariance matrix.
We did not believe that such an approach was possible in the Challenge because we are not aware of an aggregated data
structure that would not substantially limit the modeling techniques that would be available to Challenge participants.
8Under the synthetic data approach, we would have to build a generative model which, when sampled, produces
data from the same joint distribution as the Fragile Families Study data. Further, we would have to build this generative
model in a way that is differentially private. There are two main approaches to building such models (differentially
private or not): using domain expertise (Drechsler, 2011) and algorithmic learning (Hardt et al., 2012). We did not
believe that we had sufficient social science domain expertise to create a realistic data generating process for the joint
distribution of all 12,942 variables in the Challenge dataset. To the best of our knowledge, existing applications of
synthetic data created based on domain expertise generally involve a much smaller number of variables. For example,
the U.S. Census Bureau released a longitudinal dataset of businesses that contained 5 synthetic variables (Kinney et al.,
2011). Although algorithmic learning approaches do not require domain expertise, they too are generally limited to
datasets with a small number of variables. For example, a recent technique based on generative adversarial neural
networks was applied to a clinical trial with 36 variables and 6,502 observations (Beaulieu-Jones et al., 2017). To the
best of our understanding, this and other related algorithmic approaches will not be effective in generating synthetic
data with 12,942 variables.
9An early tool for interactive differentially private data analysis is PINQ (Privacy Integrated Queries) (McSherry,
2009). PINQ is geared toward data analysis and summary statistics like SQL (Structured Query Language). It also
supports basic machine learning algorithms, but it is not clear if it allows building complex machine learning models
with many predictors. PINQ requires data analysts to learn a new programing language—a combination of C# and
LINQ, a SQL-like language—in order to express their queries. Further, like all differentially private systems, PINQ
imposes a privacy budget whereby each query has a query-specific privacy cost and analysts have a fixed budget. This
budget ensures that the claimed differential privacy guarantees can be met, but it introduces substantial complexity
for analysts who are not already familiar with differential privacy. More recently, the Harvard University Privacy
Tools Project is attempting to build techniques for differentially private access to social science datasets. They have
developed a tool named PSI (Private data Sharing Interface), but it did not appear to be publicly available at the time
of the Challenge. Further, based on a recent paper (Gaboardi et al., 2016), it appears that PSI does not (yet) support
high-dimensional statistical and machine learning models; it is not clear if these limitations are fundamental. We
believe that tools like PINQ and PSI are promising approaches to interactive differential privacy, and organizers of
future projects similar to the Fragile Families Challenge should consider these tools and related tools that may be
developed in the future.
19
interactive—were feasible for the Fragile Families Challenge.10
The second major class of provable privacy techniques that we considered is based on
cryptography. Specifically, we considered ideas related to homomorphic encryption, which is a
technique to encrypt data in such a way that computing a function f() on the encrypted data and
decrypting the result yields the same output as computing f() on the original data.11 For the
Challenge, we imagined utilizing homomorphic encryption as follows: (1) we could homomor-
phically encrypt the Challenge data and release it to everyone because the encryption would make
re-identification attacks infeasible; (2) Challenge participants could build specially constructed
models on the encrypted data (models designed to work on the unencrypted data cannot be run
on the encrypted data); (3) participants could upload their encrypted predictions to the Challenge
server; (4) the Challenge server would decrypt the predictions and calculate the mean square error.
While this approach sounds very promising, there a number of concerns—both conceptual12 and
practical13—which led us to conclude that approaches using homomorphic encryption were not
appropriate for the Challenge.
To summarize, we did not think that approaches that offered provable guarantees— differ-
ential privacy or cryptography—were applicable in our setting. We hope that these techniques will
10There are also other parts of the differential privacy literature that appear related to our problem but turn out not
to be relevant. For example, there is a large literature on techniques for differentially private machine learning. In this
body of work, the privacy problem to be solved is that the model trained on private data (for example, a set of weights
for logistic regression) might itself leak information about the training data. This research assumes that the learning
algorithm has direct access to the raw data; the privacy question pertains to the algorithm’s outputs. Thus, it is not
applicable to our setting, as it assumes that researchers have access to the raw data.
11More precisely, the code for f() is transformed into a function that operates on encrypted data, and these opera-
tions are potentially computationally expensive, requiring cryptographic operations for every bit manipulation in f().
Early homomorphic encryption techniques were limited in the variety of functions that could be computed under en-
cryption, and so they were called “SomeWhat Homomorphic Encryption” (SWHE). A breakthrough by Gentry (2009)
removed these limitations enabling “Fully Homomorphic Encryption” (FHE). The downside is that FHE introduces
computational overheads that make it currently impractical in many contexts.
12Conceptually, there is a much simpler way to offer the same level of privacy guarantees: releasing no raw data,
requiring contestants to upload code to the Challenge server, executing that code on the server, and revealing only the
mean squared error. We think homomorphic encryption is useful only when the data owner is computationally limited
or both parties have private inputs. In the former case, homomorphic encryption allows outsourcing of expensive
computations (such as machine learning), which might be desirable even after we account for the slowdown introduced
by computation under encryption. In the latter case, homomorphic encryption allows the data recipient to keep a
proprietary algorithm secret. Neither of these conditions were met in our situation.
13Practically, at the time of the Challenge it took substantial expertise to create even extremely simple statistical
models that could run on encrypted data. Experts on homomorphic encryption have likened the process of creating
these models to programming in assembly language (Crawford et al., 2018).
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continue to improve and will ultimately become more useful in this type of setting in the future.
Because we could not deploy a technique with provable guarantees, we undertook a process of
threat modeling and threat mitigation, which we now describe.
3 Threats and mitigations
Given that re-identification attacks were possible and technical solutions with provable
guarantees were not available, we sought to better understand the possible risks and then reduce
them as much as possible. Therefore, we undertook a process of threat modeling and threat mit-
igation (Shostack, 2014). During the threat modeling we tried to imagine very specific, concrete
risks. When considering these risks, we found that it was helpful to separately consider the prob-
ability of harm and the magnitude of harm. Further, we tried to avoid spending an inappropriate
amount of time considering high harm events with a low probability (Sunstein, 2002). We also
found it helpful to separate risk to us as organizers of the Challenge from risk to the survey re-
spondents. We were much more accepting of risk to ourselves (e.g., reputational risk) than risk for
study participants. Once these risks were identified, we tried to design steps that would mitigate
these risks.
Our threat modeling was primarily focused on re-identification attacks and revolved around
two main questions: (a) who might have the skills and rich auxiliary information that would be
needed for a re-identification attack? and (b) who might have the incentive to carry out such an
attack? In order to help answer these questions, we conducted an in-house attack of our own data.
We imagined possible data sources that could (a) be identified and (b) contain variables that also
exist in the Fragile Families Study. Just as Sweeney (2002b) merged identified voting records
with de-identified medical records in order to create identified medical records (7), we tried to find
information an attacker might merge with the Fragile Families Challenge data.
After envisioning and investigating many types of auxiliary data, we used one such source
to attack our own data. This in-house attack demonstrated that many respondents were unique
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Child delinquent
behavior
Parental drug use
Name
Address
Age, sex, party ID,
voted in primary election
voted in general election
Fragile Families Study Identified voting records
Figure 8: Hypothetical example of re-identification attack of the Fragile Families Study. The
Fragile Families Study does not contain information on voting, but if it did, these variables could
be linked to an identified auxiliary data source: administrative voting records. After completing
this linkage, an adversary could learn about potentially sensitive information, such as parental drug
use and child delinquent behavior. This hypothetical attack, as well as our actual in-house attack,
would be possible even if the data did not include any geographic information.
in both the Fragile Families Study and the auxiliary data source, and it led to modifications of
our data that we will describe later in the paper. We will illustrate the general structure of our
attack with a hypothetical example. Suppose that the Fragile Families Study collected data on
voting behavior, recording in each wave of data collection variables such as sex, age, party ID, and
whether the respondent voted in the most recent primary and general elections. These variables are
also available in identified voter registration databases which would allow an adversary to merge
them (see Figure 8).14 A key feature of this hypothetical attack, as well as our real in-house attack,
was that it did not involve the use of zip code or any other geographic information. Thus, even
though the two real attacks that we described previously in this paper used zip code (Figure 7),
we wish to highlight the fact that it is still possible to re-identify data even if it does not contain
obvious geographic information.
The process of attacking our data was useful for three reasons. First, it helped us realize
14The ability of this hypothetical merge to succeed depends on how unique people are in the dataset and in the
population. As an extreme example, imagine a child’s mother who was 24 years old in 2000. Suppose this mother
registered with the Green party in 2000, the Republican party in 2002, and the Democratic party in 2004. In each year,
she voted in the primary election but not the general election. This respondent’s particular combination of variables
may be unique in the entire U.S. population and this person would be at risk in this kind of merge. More generally the
more unique each person is, the more vulnerable they would be to this kind of attack.
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how a small number of variables could substantially aid re-identification. In particular, continuous
variables like age made re-identification especially easy because they differentiated people into
many groups. We decided to redact or modify variables that we thought were most likely to be the
target of an attack, as we will describe more below. Second, our attempts to attack our data made
us realize the difficulty of obtaining auxiliary data at the national level. An attacker to the Fragile
Families Challenge file would likely need a dataset that is national in scope, but state differences in
data sources make assembling such a data source difficult (but certainly not impossible). Finally,
attempting to attack our own data made our fears about re-identification concrete and produced a
clear way to explain the risks to our Board of Advisors and to other stakeholders.
This in-house re-identification attack was part of a larger process of moving away from a
general fear of re-identification toward specific, actionable worries about particular people with a
dangerous combination of capability and incentives. Next, we summarize the five biggest threats
on which we focused, roughly ordered by the amount of risk we think they posed. Then, we briefly
discuss other threats on which we did not focus during the Challenge but which might be important
in other settings. After describing these threats, we describe the six main steps we took to mitigate
those threats, roughly ordered by our perception of their importance (Table 1). When describing
our threat modeling and threat mitigation process, we will be intentionally vague at certain points
because versions of the Fragile Families Study data exist in the research community outside of our
control, and we do not wish to increase the risk of a re-identification attack in the future.
3.1 Threats
3.1.1 Threat 1: A privacy researcher
Privacy researchers represent an important “threat” to any social science dataset. They have
the skills to re-identify the data and the incentives to conduct and publicize an attack. Although
we describe privacy researchers as a “threat,” we wish to emphasize that these researchers have
good intentions. Some privacy researchers undertake attacks with the goal of developing defensive
techniques that can prevent future attacks. Other privacy researchers might seek to illustrate privacy
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Low Careful Challenge Application Ethical Modifications
profile language structure process appeal to data
Privacy researcher
Nosy neighbor
Troll
Journalist
Cheater
Table 1: Five main threats and the six main steps we took to mitigate those threats. Rows
represent potential threats. Columns represent actions we took to mitigate the threats. Check marks
indicate that we expected the action to be effective against the adversary. For each adversary (row)
the circled check mark represents the action we felt was most effective against that adversary.
problems in a particular dataset (e.g., Zimmer 2010), with the goal of encouraging other data
stewards to be more careful before a true adversary finds the problems.15
Because privacy researchers represent an important and sometimes misunderstood threat, it
is helpful to briefly describe the history and norms of this community so that other researchers can
better understand their motivations. Today’s information security and privacy research community
traces its intellectual lineage in part to the field of cryptography and its military applications in
which secrets must be defended against powerful adversaries, with human lives at stake (Kahn,
1996). The research culture of cryptography is shaped by its painful history of naively optimistic
claims of “unbreakable” ciphers. Centuries of failures of such claims gradually established the
importance of adversarial analysis as a scientific technique. Computer scientists today believe that
scientific rigor in data privacy protection technology can be obtained only if claims are subject to
adversarial scrutiny (Menezes et al., 1996). Further, in the absence of a specific known adversary,
privacy researchers believe that the prudent course of action is to assume the union of all such
adversaries, i.e., a very powerful one. Assuming a capable adversary with complete knowledge of
15Based on our experience, we believe that this strategy is effective. The threat of privacy researchers caused us to
be more careful.
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the system is a central principle in cryptography known as Shannon’s maxim (Shannon, 1949).
Privacy researchers consider real data releases to be valuable targets for demonstrations
(i.e., Sweeney 2002b; Narayanan and Shmatikov 2008; Zimmer 2010), because they believe that
work with toy data sets has limited ecological validity. Apart from the scientific benefit, re-
identification demonstrations on real datasets are seen as ways to warn consumers of risks and
disincentivize bogus claims of security. However, not all real data releases are equally attractive
targets, at least for academic privacy researchers. It is difficult to publish re-identification research
unless there is novelty in the method, and this desire for novelty has served as a check on the num-
ber of such studies in practice. In other words, ironically, datasets that are too easy to re-identify
are likely to escape the attention of privacy researchers.
What about the risks of re-identification research? Debate around this question is informed
by the debates on the ethics of offensive computer security research more generally. In short,
this community has concluded that they must engage in privacy attacks in order to anticipate and
mitigate weaknesses in data protection before they are discovered by more nefarious adversaries.
3.1.2 Threat 2: A nosy neighbor
In addition to privacy researchers, a very different kind of threat comes from a group of
people with very different motivations and knowledge, a group often called nosy neighbors. These
people often have a specific interest in a single person in the dataset and already have substantial
auxiliary information about that person. In the Fragile Families Challenge, we imagined that a
mother might want to re-identify the data to learn about the survey answers provided by the father.16
16The threat of a nosy neighbor attack can be illustrated through the example of the Netflix Prize, a mass col-
laboration that partially inspired the Fragile Families Challenge and which was subject to a re-identification attack
(Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008). In 2006, Netflix offered a million-dollar prize to the team that could most improve
its movie recommendation algorithm. Netflix released a dataset of ratings made on specific movies by specific users.
Researchers were challenged to use the ratings in the public data to predict held-out movie ratings. Before Netflix
released the data, they took some steps to prevent re-identification and the data appeared to be anonymized; they con-
sisted solely of movie ratings without any explicit individual identifiers. However, Narayanan and Shmatikov (2008)
found that the vast majority of users had histories of movie ratings that were unique in the sample and were statistically
likely to be unique in the population. If you knew some of the movies one of these individuals had watched, you could
re-identify their row in the data and see all of the movies they had rated. As the authors describe, “a water-cooler
conversation with an office colleague about her cinematographic likes and dislikes may yield enough information”
(Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008). Given this water cooler information, a nosy neighbor would only need minimal
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The linked nature of the Fragile Families data makes a nosy neighbor attack easier because the
attacker could herself be in the data. They would only need to find themselves in order to learn
more about the responses of the people in their family.
3.1.3 Threat 3: A troll
Third, we considered the possibility of a troll who might attempt to re-identify the data
because they enjoy causing trouble or seeking attention (see Phillips 2015). While some adver-
saries (i.e., a privacy researcher) might be able to harm our academic careers, a troll who posted
respondents’ information online might actually harm survey respondents.
We also considered the possibility of a “hacktivist” who might attempt to re-identify the
data to make a larger political point. For instance, the hacker group Anonymous publicly posted the
names and social media profiles of members of the KKK in 2015. When doing so, they wrote: “We
hope Operation KKK will, in part, spark a bit of constructive dialogue about race, racism, racial
terror and freedom of expression” (Franceschi-Bicchierai, 2015). Might there exist adversaries
who have similarly negative feelings toward social scientists doing research on a disadvantaged
population? We would hope that potential hacktivists would recognize our good intentions, but we
could not rule out the possibility that someone would attack the study to make a statement against
our project or against social science research in general.
3.1.4 Threat 4: A journalist
A fourth adversary we considered was a journalist. For example, in 2006 AOL made the
searches of thousands of users available to the public, assuming that one’s search terms would
not be easily traceable back to an individual’s identity. Contrary to their expectations, Barbaro
et al. (2006) wrote a widely-read New York Times article revealing the identity of one woman
whose search information had been included in the release. We worried that a journalist could do
the same thing with the data from the Fragile Families Challenge. Like a privacy researcher, a
technical abilities to re-identify the colleague by retrieving the user record that most closely matched the known likes
and dislikes.
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journalist might be motivated to attack the data to make a larger point. However, we believe that
a journalist bound by the norms of his or her profession would be unlikely to intentionally harm
study participants. Therefore, we reasoned that journalists posed a greater risk to us, as organizers,
than to the survey respondents.
3.1.5 Threat 5: A cheater
Finally, prior challenges have been won through strategies involving re-identification (Narayanan
et al., 2011). We worried that, if we set up the Challenge with a big prize and no clear prohibitions
on linkage to auxiliary data, someone might try to win by re-identification. An adversary who
re-identified the respondents could contact them and discover their outcomes, thereby achieving
remarkably successful predictive performance.
3.1.6 Other threats
These five adversaries—privacy researcher, nosy neighbor, troll, journalist, and cheater—
were the ones that we considered most closely in our threat modeling. However, this list is not
exhaustive of the threats that we considered or the threats that might arise in other situations. For
instance, three other adversaries that we considered—and which might be more important in other
settings—are governments, criminals, and companies.
Certain parts of the U.S. government most likely have the skills and rich auxiliary data
that would be needed for a re-identification attack of our data. They might also have the incentive
if our data contained information they could not find elsewhere, such as if respondents in our
survey had reported on their experience as spies for a foreign government. Because we deemed
the information in our data to be of little value to the U.S. government, we did not believe the U.S.
government had an incentive to conduct such an attack in our setting.
A different set of attackers might be motivated by financial gain. For example, compa-
nies seeking to build databases for targeted marketing might try to acquire large social science
datasets. Given the size, structure, and de-identification of our data, however, we believed that it
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would be unattractive to companies. Further, sophisticated criminals might wish to attack a dataset
containing credit card numbers or containing compromising information on wealthy individuals
that could be used as the basis for blackmail. Our data do not contain information like credit card
numbers, and we reasoned that an adversary with the goal of finding compromising information
on elites would more likely target other datasets. Therefore, we believed that an attack motivated
by financial gain—either by a company or criminal—was unlikely in our setting.
While our threat modeling was mainly focused on re-identification attacks that would oc-
cur through a merge with auxiliary information, other attacks were also possible. For example, we
considered that someone might attempt to learn the identity of the survey respondents by breaking
into the Fragile Families Study offices and physically stealing computers. We deemed this possi-
bility extremely unlikely, mostly because we did not see a clear incentive to carry out this attack.
Further, there are defenses in place that would make this attack more difficult than it appears. These
defenses also make the possibility of accidental leak of information extremely unlikely. Overall,
we would recommend that other researchers conduct a similar threat modeling exercise, keeping
in mind that the threats in each situation might be different.
3.2 Threat mitigation
There is no way with present technology to completely eliminate the risks that these threats
pose while achieving the scientific objectives of the mass collaboration. Nevertheless, we took six
main steps to make an attack more difficult and less attractive. The columns of Table 1 represent
these steps and their expected efficacy against various adversaries. We have ordered our actions in
terms of our perception of their importance, from most to least important.
3.2.1 Low profile
When organizing a mass collaboration, one might seek press coverage in major national
and international venues. Such publicity would help to attract the widest and most diverse pool
of participants possible, but it could also increase the risk of attack. High-profile studies are more
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likely to attract the attention of a nosy neighbor, a troll seeking attention, or a journalist or privacy
researcher looking to re-identify a project that will draw interest from a wide readership. A low-
profile study is less likely to be noticed by these adversaries and might be a less attractive target.
During the Challenge, we decided to keep a relatively low profile, and we focused our
outreach on settings with a high probability of yielding participants who could contribute and a
low probability of yielding participants who might attack the data.
For example, to raise awareness about the Challenge, we emailed the directors of Popula-
tion Centers funded by the National Institutes of Health, and we hosted getting-started workshops
at universities, in courses, and at scientific conferences. Our strategy of keeping a low profile can
be easily adopted by other mass collaborations.
3.2.2 Careful language
Many data stewards may not realize it, but using careful, precise, and humble language may
help prevent an attack from a privacy researcher or journalist. For instance, Zimmer (2010) made
an ethical example out of the Tastes, Ties, and Time study in part because the original authors made
strong statements such as “all identifying information was deleted or encoded,” (quoted by Zim-
mer 2010 from the original study codebook). Privacy researchers may wish to correct data stewards
who make overly confident statements about the de-identified nature of their data. By choosing lan-
guage carefully, data stewards can be more honest about the safety of their data, thereby removing
the need for privacy scholars to correct them. Instead of saying that “all identifying information
was deleted,” one might say, “we removed information that was obviously identifiable.” Instead of
writing that data are “anonymized,” data stewards should write that steps were taken to make the
data less identifiable. Small changes in language can help to convey that data stewards understand
the privacy risks and have made a reasoned judgment to proceed anyway. For example, we wrote
the following on the Fragile Families Challenge website:
“All participants in the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study have consented to
have their data used for social research. These procedures, as well as procedures to
29
make de-identified data available to researchers, have been reviewed and approved by
the Institutional Review Board of Princeton University (#5767). The procedures for
the Fragile Families Challenge have been reviewed and approved by the Institutional
Review Board of Princeton University (#8061). In addition, we have also taken further
steps to protect the participants in the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study. If
you would like to know more, please send us an email.”
We believe that the relatively easy step of using careful language and inviting contact from potential
attackers decreased the risk of attack.
3.2.3 Structure of Challenge
The structure of the Challenge was also designed in part to decrease the incentives to attack
the data. By avoiding asking Challenge participants to predict sensitive outcomes, such as involve-
ment in the criminal justice system or sexual behavior, we think that we reduced the risk of attack
from a privacy researcher, journalist, or troll. Avoiding potentially sensitive outcomes was part of
keeping a low profile, and we suspect that it was important.
We also built certain things into the Challenge that would decrease the risk of a cheater
attacking the data. First, in contrast to other high-profile challenges that offered large monetary
prizes (Bennett et al., 2007), we chose to reward the best submissions with a trip to Princeton Uni-
versity to discuss their work. This prize was designed to emphasize an intrinsic goal of knowledge
creation rather than an extrinsic financial incentive, thereby reducing incentives to cheat. Second,
we emphasized in all promotional materials that the Challenge was a mass collaboration and a new
way of working together, not a competition. For example, the banner at the top of our website read,
“What would happen if hundreds of social scientists and data scientists worked together on a scien-
tific challenge to improve the lives of disadvantaged children in the United States?” In the approval
process, we also asked people about their motivations to participate, thereby encouraging them to
reflect on their reasons. Nearly all participants responded with motivations that involved partic-
ipation in scientific research or helping disadvantaged children. Third, we made the rules of the
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Challenge very clear that linking to auxiliary data sources was not allowed, and that anyone who
did so would be disqualified. Fourth, we required all participants to upload their code and a narra-
tive explanation along with their prediction. If a cheater successfully attacked the data and merged
in outside information, this process would have to be obscured in whatever code was uploaded.
Altogether, we think that these aspects of the structure of the Challenge decreased incentives to
attack the data.
3.2.4 Application process
In the interest of open and reproducible science, many have argued that research data should
be made public. While we agree with the spirit of this call, we join others making the more
modest call for open sharing of data with allowable constraints when privacy or other concerns
must be balanced against the goal of open science (Freese and Peterson, 2017; Salganik, 2018). In
particular, an application process can help ensure that only those who can plausibly yield scientific
benefit be given access to the data and that participants who pose increased risk can be monitored
more closely.
For the Challenge, we developed a process to screen applicants (Figure 9). Initially, people
interested in participating completed an application that asked for information about their educa-
tional background, research experience, and motivations to participate in the study (see Appendix
for the exact application). Responses to the application were sent to an email account checked
by two of the Challenge’s central organizers (Lundberg and Salganik). One of the Challenge or-
ganizers would provide an initial review of the application, in many cases searching the internet
to corroborate claims made in the application or to look for important information that was ex-
cluded.17 The reviewer would make an initial recommendation as to whether a participant should
be approved and would send a summary of the application to a team of eight reviewers including
17Applications from students were sometimes difficult to evaluate, given that students often have little research
experience to report. We occasionally spoke with a student’s academic advisor to ensure that participation was being
overseen by a responsible individual who understood the importance of respecting the data. In one case, we pointed
a student toward alternative datasets that were less sensitive which would serve as equally useful for that student’s
project.
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all the authors of this paper, survey administrators, and the Principal Investigators of the Fragile
Families Study. Members of this broader review team were given 24 hours to raise any opposition
to the application.18
After this review process, we required approved applicants to type a set of statements ac-
knowledging their agreement with our terms and conditions (the full set of statements is provided
in the Appendix). The purpose of the terms and conditions was not to screen participants, but to
make sure they understood their ethical responsibilities (see Section 3.2.5).
After an approved applicant had agreed to the terms and conditions, we emailed her a link
to an encrypted data file (the link automatically expired within seven days). Finally, the approved
participant had to call us by phone to receive the password to decrypt the file. This last step reduced
the risk that an email could be intercepted and also provided an opportunity to speak in person with
participants and thereby reinforce that the project was a mass collaboration involving real people,
not a competition to be won at all costs.
During the Challenge, we received 472 applications19, and most were uneventful. However,
about 10 applications raised yellow flags that we addressed either by sending a follow-up email
or by having a discussion with the applicant (in person or by video chat). These conversations
helped ensure mutual understanding of the importance of respecting the privacy of respondents.
For instance, one applicant told us they were working on the “record linkage problem with massive
data.” Another applicant told us of a research interest in re-identification. In both cases, we were
glad to have spoken with the applicant before providing the data. In one case, a researcher who
had previous experience doing re-identification attacks did not respond to our follow-up email and
was therefore not granted access to the data.
One might worry that this screening process—which involved many hours of work from the
Challenge organizers, graduate students, study staff, and Principal Investigators—was completely
18We occasionally omitted this waiting period when individuals were participating in a known setting, such as a
class assignment or a workshop in which we spoke directly with potential participants.
19The first 103 of these applications came in the pilot test we ran in an undergraduate machine learning class at
Princeton and followed a slightly different format from the rest because we modified the application procedure based
on feedback from the pilot test.
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Application received
Central organizer
(Lundberg or Salganik)
perceives a threat?
Yes
No
Organizer follows up
with applicant
Applicant responds?
Yes
No
End of process
Deemed a threat?
No
Yes
Applicant invited to participate
locally on a secure computer
Recommendation for approval sent
to full review committee
Approved by committee?
Yes
No
Participant completes Terms and Conditions
and agrees to behave ethically
Data sent to participant
through secure online file sharing
Participant calls to request password to open the data
Figure 9: Screening process for applications to the Fragile Families Challenge. Each potential
participant completed an application describing their educational background, research experience,
and motivations to participate in the study. We assessed these applications in terms of their ability
to contribute to the goals of the Challenge and in terms of the risk that an applicant might try
to re-identify respondents. Each application was reviewed by one of the lead organizers of the
Challenge, sent to a review committee, and then approved 24 hours later if there were no objections.
After approval, participants completed a set of terms and conditions, received a link to an encrypted
file, and then called us for a password to open the file. For further details, see the main text. To
review the application form and the terms and conditions, see the Appendix.
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futile because people could just lie in their applications. However, from our threat modeling we
suspected that well-intentioned privacy researchers might represent our greatest threat. These in-
dividuals believe strongly in ethical use of data, and we suspected that they would be honest in
their applications. Because those who posed the greatest threat also seemed unlikely to lie in an
application, we believe our screening process was a worthwhile endeavor.
One final aspect of the application process is worth describing. Initially, we were worried
about what might happen if we actually rejected an applicant. Might this rejection anger someone
and turn them into an even more motivated adversary who would attempt find the data elsewhere
(i.e., from another participant) and then attack it? Because of this concern, we made preparations
to accept high-risk applicants as local participants. For these local participants, we prepared a
special, secure computer in the office of the Fragile Families project director. This computer was
configured such that it was difficult to bring data onto the computer or take data off the computer
(e.g., drives were deactivated and the computer was not connected to the internet and was locked to
the wall). However, we maintained the ability to re-connect this computer to the internet ourselves
to upload a Challenge participant’s predictions if needed. Fortunately, we never had to use this
secure computer, but it provided an opportunity for us to remain open to the potential participation
of even the riskiest applicants.
3.2.5 Ethical appeal
It is not possible to force people to act ethically, nor is it possible in a screening process to
determine with full confidence whether an applicant plans to act ethically. However, one can clar-
ify for participants the ethical implications of misusing the data, thereby creating the possibility
that those who might plan to re-identify the data will consider this plan from an ethical perspec-
tive before proceeding. After participants’ applications were approved, they completed a set of
terms and conditions designed to achieve this goal. Every participant read the following statement,
written in bold, before participating.
“The Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study is a dataset of real people who have
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selflessly opened up their lives to us for the last 15 years so that their experiences can
contribute to scientific research. By participating in the Fragile Families Challenge,
you become a collaborator in this project. It is of the utmost importance that you
respect the families in the data by using what they have told us responsibly.”
After reading the statement, each participant typed a set of statements defining how they would
use the data responsibly (see Appendix for specific statements). Participants could easily lie in
this section, so it would not have stopped someone determined to act unethically. However, by
outlining our expectations, we clarified a positive vision of what ethical behavior would entail.
3.2.6 Modifications to data
The final step we took to mitigate threats was to modify the data in the Challenge file.
Overall, these modifications were relatively minor because the preexisting Fragile Families Study
files had already undergone an extensive process to promote privacy (Figure 4).
First, as described earlier, we attempted to attack the data ourselves, and this led us to make
certain changes in the structure of the background data file for the Challenge. We choose not to
describe these changes fully, but we note that some were inspired by prior re-identification demon-
strations. We did not implement a k-anonymity approach (Sweeney, 2002b)20, but we did make
more minor changes such as adding noise to key variables to make a simple 1-to-1 merge more dif-
ficult.21 Although adding noise has a long tradition in the statistical literature (Kim, 1986; Reiter,
20k-anonymity states that data should only be released if each row is exactly the same as at least k − 1 other
rows, so that an adversary with perfect auxiliary data would be able to link a given individual with no fewer than k
records (Sweeney, 2002b). The higher the value of k chosen, the more difficult it would be for an adversary to find
all candidates and discover the true match. k-anonymity can be achieved by suppressing information on key features
of certain individuals that would otherwise make them unique (Sweeney, 2002a). Unfortunately, k-anonymity quickly
becomes infeasible as the number of features grows, since rows are rarely exactly the same on the joint set of all
features (Aggarwal, 2005), which means that a pure k-anonymity approach would substantially harm the utility of the
data (Brickell and Shmatikov, 2008). Despite the impossibility of applying k-anonymity to all 12,942 variables, we
did apply the spirit of this approach to try to reduce the number of participants who were unique or nearly unique in
the sample on a subset of variables.
21The noise we discuss here is distinct in two ways from the noise added in differential privacy. First, we added
noise to the inputs to participants’ models, whereas differential privacy adds noise to the outputs. Second, we added
normally distributed noise, a choice distinct from the differential privacy approach of heavy-tailed Laplacian noise.
Our approach to adding noise does not yield provable privacy guarantees.
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2012), it is not foolproof in the high-dimensional setting. 22 Despite its limitations, adding noise
to key variables at least makes a simple 1-1 merge with auxiliary data more difficult. For instance,
we worried that height, weight, and body mass index (BMI) could be key linking variables if there
was a breach of identified medical records data in the future, so we added a small amount of noise
to these variables. We also added noise to other variables which we choose not to identify. The
noise we added came from an independent draw for each variable, with the exception of variables
that measured the same construct (i.e., height in inches and height in centimeters). In these cases,
we drew one noise term per child per construct, so that an adversary could not reduce the size of
the noise by averaging over multiple responses. Overall, we added noise to a few hundred vari-
ables. To minimize the risk of unnecessary harm to the scientific promise of the project, the noise
we added was always relatively small,23 and Challenge participants were generally unaware of the
added noise.24 We suspect that adding noise made re-identification slightly harder with minimal
harm to the scientific utility of the data.
In addition to seeking to make a re-identification attack more difficult, we also sought to
reduce the magnitude of harm should re-identification occur by redacting some information that
we thought might pose a serious risk to survey respondents. When considering whether to redact
information for harm reduction, we tried to weigh how much harm might come to how many
people against how much the redaction might jeopardize the scientific goals of the project. While
making these decisions, we were aware that in a large dataset it can be difficult to know which
information will be sensitive (Salganik, 2018, Ch. 6).
Finally, we decided that we did not want the Challenge data files to include anything that
might obviously provide information about the survey respondent’s location. Unlike adding noise,
we think this decision to strip geographic information may have decreased Challenge participants’
ability to predict the six key outcomes. However, we think that removing obvious geographic
22For example, Netflix added noise to some of the data used in the Netflix Prize, but this did not prevent a re-
identification attack (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2008).
23For more on the risks of adding too much noise see Brickell and Shmatikov (2008).
24In one case a participant noticed that the distribution of some variables did not match that listed in the official
study documentation, thereby correctly realizing that we had changed something in those variables. This participant
emailed us, and we were happy to explain what we had done.
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information made a re-identification attack much more difficult. If an attacker were able to place
a group of survey respondents in a particular city, then the attacker would only need an identified
auxiliary data source that includes that city (e.g., state voting records). However, if the respondents
could be anywhere in the country, then the attacker would need national data which may be harder
to acquire.
Although many privacy audits focus mostly on modifications to the data, we saw this as
just one of the six steps that we took to mitigate threats. In fact, we think that many of other steps,
such as keeping a low profile, were more important in this setting.
3.3 Comprehensive assessment
After implementing the threat modeling and threat mitigation described above, which evolved
over a period of months, we stepped back and comprehensively assessed who might have incen-
tives to attack the data and what barriers might stand in their way (see Table 1).
A privacy researcher would have to learn and care about the project despite our low profile.
Even then, privacy researchers would only have an incentive to attack the data if they wanted to
show publicly that we had done something wrong; our careful language incorporating the findings
of privacy researchers mitigated against this danger. The privacy researcher would then have to lie
in the application process or otherwise convince us they did not intend to re-identify the data, and
they would have to proceed in the face of our ethical appeal. To the extent that privacy researchers
are motivated by an ethical call for researchers to recognize the limits of privacy and handle data
with care, we expected that these steps substantially reduced the risk that a privacy researcher
would re-identify the data.
Nosy neighbors are almost impossible to stop with technical barriers; enormous changes to
the data would be needed to render a respondent unrecognizable to a nosy neighbor. By keeping
a low profile, we reduced the likelihood that a nosy neighbor would learn about the Challenge.
By screening participants, we increased the chance that we would notice a nosy neighbor before
sharing the data. With these changes in place, we determined that the risk of nosy neighbors
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increased only negligibly from the Challenge, compared with the risk that already existed from the
availability of the Fragile Families Study data to researchers.
A troll might lie through the application process, be undeterred by an appeal to ethics,
and have the technical skills to overcome our modifications to the data. However, a troll is likely
to pursue the highest-profile targets for attention, so a low profile reduces the chance of a troll
attacking the data.
A journalist would primarily be stopped by the application process: we expect that a jour-
nalist, because of the norms of their field, would not lie when applying to use the data. Even
a journalist who made it through the screening process would have to find the project interest-
ing despite its low profile, ignore our appeal to ethics, and succeed in the technical difficulties of
re-identification despite our modifications to the data. This seemed unlikely.
The threat from a cheater was primarily mitigated by the Challenge structure, which ex-
plicitly stated that anyone who cheated would be ineligible for a prize, which was non-monetary to
begin with. With this structure, we doubted anyone would re-identify the data for the sole purpose
of winning the Challenge.
To summarize, the design of the Challenge did not completely eliminate any of the threats
we imagined, but it mitigated them to a sufficient degree that we concluded the Challenge only
slightly increased the risk to participants above that which already existed from the use of the
Fragile Families Study data by independent researchers.
4 Response plan
Having mitigated—but not eliminated—the risk of re-identification, we created a response
plan in case something went wrong. More specifically, we took steps to ensure that we had the
appropriate people involved in the project so that we could begin responding to a crisis quickly
and forcefully. Our Board of Advisors included a computer scientist who had previously re-
identified several datasets (Arvind Narayanan), a sociologist and lawyer with expertise in data
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privacy, surveillance, and inequality (Karen Levy), and a journalist (Nicholas Lemann). In the
event of an attack from a privacy researcher, the organizers of the Challenge would consult with
Narayanan when responding. If a social scientist or policymaker criticized the project for mis-
handling the private information of disadvantaged children, the organizers of the Challenge would
consult with Levy when responding. If the data were re-identified by a journalist who planned to
publicize the story, the organizers of the Challenge would consult with Lemann. Each of these
individuals is respected in various communities that might attack the data, and we hoped that they
could mediate and guide the project through any problems which might arise. We recommend that
other data stewards take similar steps to prepare for the unexpected, both in the mass collaborative
setting and in the more common setting of providing data for use by individual researchers.
5 Third-party guidance
It is easy for those coordinating a project to fall into groupthink and ignore potential prob-
lems out of a common interest in the success of the project. To avoid this pitfall, we worked under
the guidance of third parties. First, the Fragile Families Study and the Fragile Families Challenge
were undertaken with the oversight of the Institutional Review Board at Princeton University.25
We created an additional community for third-party guidance by assembling a Board of
Advisors. The Board included professors of sociology, education, and social work who had each
devoted much of their careers to studying disadvantaged families, a journalism professor, a ma-
chine learning researcher, and a computational social scientist, some of whom are authors of this
paper. During our privacy and ethics audit we sent the Board weekly updates about our progress.
These weekly updates were also shared with staff working on the Fragile Families Study, as well
as other stakeholders. We found this process of weekly updates incredibly valuable both to sharpen
our thinking and to ensure that all stakeholders were involved.
Finally, we also sought informal advice from a wide variety of people not involved in
25Components of the Fragile Families Study were also reviewed by the Institutional Review Boards of partner
institutions (i.e., Columbia University and Westat, the data collection contractor).
39
the Challenge in any way. These outsiders included a philosophy professor, a member of the
military with experience planning high-risk operations, a lawyer with experience dealing with
health records, and a public-interest lawyer who provides direct services to children in foster care.
We found that these uninvolved third-parties often provided an interesting perspective, and we
would encourage other data stewards to have broad discussions if possible. Overall, we believe
that third-party guidance helped improve our process.
6 Ethical framework
During our process we had to make many different decisions, and these decisions were
guided by the principles described in the Belmont Report (National Commission for the Protection
of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1978), a foundational document in
social science research ethics. More specifically, the Belmont Report emphasizes three principles
that should guide research ethics: respect for persons, beneficence, and justice.
6.1 Respect for persons
The principle of respect for persons means that researchers should respect each participant’s
autonomy to choose whether to participate after being informed about the nature of the research.
This principle is often operationalized as the process of informed consent. In this case, when par-
ents and children agreed to participate in the Fragile Families Study, they understood that the data
they provided would be used for scientific research. Therefore, when designing and conducting
the Challenge we remained within the context of scientific research as much as possible in order to
honor the agreement between survey respondents and researchers. For example, when structuring
the Challenge we decided not to offer prize money because that is not generally consistent with
the context of scientific research. Our thinking about preserving context was heavily influenced by
Nissenbaum’s (2009) work on the importance of “contextual integrity.”
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6.2 Beneficence
The second key principle discussed in the Belmont Report is beneficence: the potential
harm of the study must be weighed against the potential benefits. Further, reasonable steps should
be taken to maximize benefits and minimize harms—both probability and magnitude. These ideas
were central to our process of threat modeling and threat mitigation. For example, these ideas
affected our changes to the data (see Section 3.2.6). We hoped to reduce the probability of harm by
redacting or adding noise to variables that we expected might aid re-identification, and we hoped to
reduce the magnitude of harm should re-identification occur by redacting some information (e.g.,
illegal behaviors). However, we made these decisions while also weighing the potential benefits
of including variables that might help contribute to scientific knowledge. For instance, we did not
redact information about child behavior problems because this information might be an especially
important predictor of adolescent outcomes. The principle of beneficence thus affected not only
our decision to release the data but also our decision about which variables ought to be released.
In addition to risks and benefits for participants in the Fragile Families Study, we also
considered possible broader social impacts of our work (Zook et al., 2017). Predictive models
similar to those built during the Challenge are increasingly being used for high-stakes decisions—
such as in criminal justice (Berk et al., 2017) and child protective services (Chouldechova et al.,
2018). Although these predictive models can improve social welfare (Kleinberg et al., 2015, 2017),
they can also discriminate against protected groups (Barocas and Selbst, 2016) and magnify social
inequality (Eubanks, 2018). Therefore, we weighed the possibility that the knowledge created in
the Challenge could be used inappropriately against the possibility that it could be used to help
policymakers who are seeking to understand the strengths and weaknesses of predictive modeling.
Because of the type of data that we used and the outcomes we selected, we believe that the risk
of unintended secondary use is low and that it is outweighed by the possible social benefits of the
research. Because the risks of the Challenge—both to survey participants and to society—were
very difficult to quantify, we found that existing ethical, philosophical, and legal debates about the
precautionary principle (O’Riordan and Cameron, 1994; Sunstein, 2003, 2005; Narayanan et al.,
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2016) and dual use research (National Research Council, 2004; Selgelid, 2009) helped guide our
thinking.
6.3 Justice
The final principle in the Belmont report is justice: risks and benefits should flow to similar
populations. Unfortunately, many failures of scientific research ethics have involved disadvantaged
or vulnerable populations (for examples see Emanuel et al. 2008). Informed by this history, social
scientists today recognize a special obligation to make ethical decisions about research involving
vulnerable populations. The fact that some participants in the Fragile Families Study are disadvan-
taged or children (or both) caused us some concern. However, the nature of the Challenge meant
that the population most likely to benefit from the scientific knowledge produced by the Challenge
was the very population from which participants were drawn. In other words, by conducting re-
search on a sample of disadvantaged urban families, we can generate knowledge that might help
improve the life chances of future families in similar positions. Thus, our approach to the prin-
ciple of justice is heavily influenced by the argument that no group should be excluded from the
potential to benefit from research (Mastroianni and Kahn, 2001).
7 Decision
Ultimately, after all the discussing, designing, and debating, we faced a decision: whether
to go forward with the Challenge or not. When forced to make a go/no-go decision, we conducted
a comprehensive re-assessment. We believed that the project was consistent with existing ethical
rules and ethical principles governing social science research. This rules-based decision was made
by our Institutional Review Board, and the principles-based decision was made by us and by mem-
bers of our Board of Advisors. We also believed that after our threat mitigation the risks were low
in an absolute sense and in appropriate balance with the potential for scientific and societal benefit.
Before a full scale launch, however, we conducted a pilot test in an attempt to discover any
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errors in our threat modeling, threat mitigation, or ethical thinking. We conducted the pilot test
by deploying the Challenge as a project in an undergraduate machine learning class at Princeton
University. In doing so, we faced a difficulty inherent in pilot testing: being realistic while also
being safe. By conducting the test in a class taught by a trusted professor, we erred on the side
of safety. In our case, the pilot test turned out to be useful; it helped us discover one variable
in the Challenge data file that was both confusing to participants and increased the risk of re-
identification. The pilot also gave us a chance to test our screening process, which we modified
for the full launch to gather more information and facilitate the process for both participants and
organizers. The full launch of the Challenge was much smoother because we started in a controlled
setting, and we highly recommend that others conduct a similar pilot test.
8 Conclusion
This case study describes the privacy and ethics audit that we conducted as part of the
Fragile Families Challenge. Our process was certainly not perfect, and we hope that by being open
about it, others can improve on what we did.26 We want to emphasize that other data stewards may
reasonably come to different decisions about how to strike an appropriate balance in their own
situation. Despite differences between situations, however, we believe that the key elements of our
approach—threat modeling, threat mitigation, and third-party guidance, all within a specific ethical
framework—may be useful to other data stewards, whether they reside in universities, companies,
or governments.
Those who might wish to follow or build on our example will undoubtedly wonder about
the costs of doing so. The approach we followed was time-consuming. We spent about three
months preparing to launch the Challenge, and the privacy and ethics audit was the most time-
consuming part (see Figure 2). The parts that took the most time were assembling a team with
appropriate expertise (including for the response plan), attacking our data, debating how to balance
26For more on a process-based approach to data access, see Rubinstein and Hartzog (2016).
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the various trade-offs, and keeping in contact with stakeholders. Attacking the data, by itself,
involved about 1.5 months of consistent work for a skilled graduate student. Beyond the amount of
time involved, this process was also stressful and emotionally taxing; some of us found it difficult
to spend so much time imagining all the worst-case scenarios of re-identification.
Although our privacy and ethics audit was time-consuming, we feel that the effort was
worthwhile. In particular, this process enabled us to run the Challenge, which has already started
to achieve some of its scientific objectives, as illustrated by the special issue in which this paper
will be published.
Finally, we hope that this case study illustrates that there is an important middle ground
between calls for no data sharing and complete data sharing. Everyone will benefit if scientists,
companies, and governments can continue to develop the technical, legal, ethical, and social in-
frastructure to enable safe and responsible data access.
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9 Appendix
This appendix includes reproductions of the web forms participants completed to (a) apply
to participate and (b) agree to a set of terms and conditions of participation.
a) We used the application to assess each applicant’s ability to contribute and motivations, and
to gain advance notice of potential threats with whom to follow up.
b) We used the terms and conditions to reinforce norms of scientific behavior and emphasize
the importance of respecting the data. The terms and conditions also include a set of items
about how we would use the submissions of Challenge participants.
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Application to Participate
For participants working in teams, each individual will need to complete this application.
Describe your previous research, coursework, or work experience that is related to the
Fragile Families Challenge. We expect that the most relevant experience will come from
social science and data science, but we are open minded. Please include links to your CV,
your published papers, and your open source software (as appropriate).
Describe your previous experience working with restricted-access data. This could be in an
academic, corporate, or governmental setting. Please be specific. If you have no experience
with restricted-access data, please let us know, and it will not automatically disqualify you
from participating.
Describe the context in which you plan to participate. For example, are you planning to
participate at a university, company, or government agency? If you are doing this in a
course, please tell us the name of the professor.
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Please let us know your current employer or if you are a student, your current university. If
you are self-employed, not employed, or retired, please say so.
Do you plan to participate in the Challenge in good faith and consistent with norms of
scientific behavior?
What is motivating you to participate?
Yes
No
  >>  
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Beyond the open responses on the previous page, we're interested in learning more about a
few specific aspects of the backgrounds and motivations of participants in the challenge.
Your responses to these questions will only be used to help us understand the Fragile
Families Challenge, and to design better challenges in the future.
There are many different reasons for wanting to participate in the Fragile Families Challenge.
Which of the following best describe your reasons for participating? (Check all that apply.)
  Applies to me Does not apply to me
General interest in topic
Curiosity about the
challenge
Contributing to social
science
To improve the lives of
disadvantaged children
To make the best-
performing model in the
challenge
For fun
Learning about cutting-
edge research
Collaborating with
colleagues/friends
Relevant to school or
degree program
Collaborating with
university researchers
Relevant to own
research
Connecting with others
who share my interests
Learning/practicing data
analysis skills
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Which of the following best describes your academic background?
Which of the following best describes your professional background?
  Applies to me Does not apply to me
Relevant to job
To work on a prestigious
research project
To earn scholarly
recognition
Required for
coursework
To experience a mass
scientific collaboration
To create the most
interesting/innovative
model in the challenge
Collaborating with
strangers
Contributing to data
science
  Applies to me Does not apply to me
Sociologist
Economist
Psychologist
Political scientist
Demographer
Data scientist
Computer scientist
No academic
background
Other (please specify)
  Applies to me Does not apply to me
Industry
Academia
Government
Nonprofit
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Do you plan to participate in the Fragile Families Challenge individually, or as part of a
group?
Are you participating in the Fragile Families Challenge as part of a class assignment?
Have you ever analyzed data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study?
Have you ever published a paper using data from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing
Study?
  Applies to me Does not apply to me
Undergraduate student
Graduate student
Not employed
Other (please specify)
Individually
As part of a group
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
  >>  
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Terms and Conditions
You will be given access to the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study (FFCWS) data for
the Fragile Families Challenge. By completing this form, you agree to fulfill your
responsibilities on this project according to the following guidelines.
For each bolded statement, re-type the statement word for word in the text box.
Additionally, please check all the boxes to agree with the sub-statements.
Your signature at the bottom verifies your agreement with the entire document.
You may contact us at fragilefamilieschallenge@gmail.com with any questions.
The Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study is a dataset of real people who have
selflessly opened up their lives to us for the last 15 years so that their experiences can
contribute to scientific research. By participating in the Fragile Families Challenge,
you become a collaborator in this project. It is of the utmost importance that you
respect the families in the data by using what they have told us responsibly.
I understand that harm could come to the survey respondents if their identities were made
public. I will not do anything to harm the respondents. I agree not to attempt to identify
individuals, families, households, or hospitals.
Type the statement below to verify your agreement. 
Agree    
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In the event that the identity of an individual, family, household, or hospital is discovered
inadvertently, I will (a) make no use of this knowledge, (b) inform the challenge organizers
at fragilefamilieschallenge@gmail.com so that they can make changes to improve the
security of the data, and (c) not inform any other persons of the discovered identity.
Type the statement below to verify your agreement. 
I understand that each member of my research team must request their own copy of the
data files. Files cannot be transferred. I will not at any time give, sell, show, disclose or
otherwise disseminate the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study data to anyone.
Type the statement below to verify your agreement. 
I will take steps to ensure that the data is safe-guarded, using protections such as
password-protected access to all computers storing the data.
Agree    
Agree    
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Type the statement below to verify your agreement. 
Once the challenge is complete, I will destroy all the data files that I used during the
challenge. If I plan to continue research with this data, I will download a new version of the
Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study data through the Princeton University Office of
Population Research (OPR) Data Archive at: http://opr.princeton.edu/archive/.
Type the statement below to verify your agreement. 
Checking this box acknowledges that my name typed below constitutes my signature and
indicates that I have read, understand, and agree to abide by the terms of this agreement.
Signature
Agree    
Agree    
I have read, understand, and agree to abide by the
terms of this agreement.
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Submission Consent Form 
You may contact us at fragilefamilieschallenge@gmail.com with any questions.
I consent for the researchers to open source my submissions once the Challenge is
complete so that they can be used for future research. If I do not want my submissions
to be open sourced, I can delete them from the Challenge website before the end of the
Challenge.
The Fragile Families Challenge may use my predictions and code to produce a
collaborative model.
I understand that I may only submit a fixed number of contributions per day.  Right now
the limit is 10 per day.
I understand that future researchers may use my open sourced submission in their
research without guaranteeing co-authorship.
If at any point you wish to remove your data, code, or narrative explanation from the
project, please email us at fragilefamilieschallenge@gmail.com.
My signature typed below affirms my agreement with the above statements.
Agree
Agree
Agree
Agree
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Email
Once we review this form, we will follow up by email with information about how to
access the data. The email address above is also where we will contact you if needed
throughout the Challenge.
>>
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